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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the original owner of the property establishes a trust and gives beneficial
interests in it to his various donees, tide will remain unified, the adminis-
tration of the donor's estate will be simplified, and the management of
the property and its possible eventual sale will be facilitated.
Subchapter S Stock
The principal shareholder of a Subchapter S corporation may desire
to make gifts of the Subchapter S stock to members of his family. If
properly done, this is an extremely efficient way of shifting the tax bur-
den on the income generated by the family business. However, care must
be exercised that the gift does not revoke the election. For example, gift
of Subchapter S stock to a trustee revokes the election2 A gift to a
custodian is permissible.2"
The determination whether or not to elect to be taxed under Sub-
chapter S is fundamentally based on the relationship between the tax
brackets of the corporation and its shareholders. 9  Gifts of stock may
change this relationship and make election desirable where it previously
was not. For example, a high bracket sole shareholder of a corporation
may give its stock to his children whose lower brackets make election
profitable. This may also provide an escape route in cases where the
threat of the accumulated earnings tax confronts a non-electing corpora-
tion the stock of which is owned by high bracket shareholders.
III
PLANNING THE FORM OF THE GIFTS
Edward J. Hawkins, Jr.
The rules of tax law, trust law, and property law relating to the form
or manner in which gifts may be made are far too numerous to permit
any useful comprehensive statement in the space available. Accordingly,
attention will be limited here to selected topics which seem especially
relevant to the problems of the Jones family, whose situation is set forth
on page 292 above. In particular, attention will be paid to the mechan-
27. CODE §§ 1371, 7701.
28. T.I.1R 113, 6 CCH 1958 STAND. FED. REP. 5 6818 (Nov. 26, 1958).
29. For general discussion of Subchapter S, see Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter
S and Section 1244, 14 TAX L. REv. 453 (1959); Note, Optional Taxation of Closely Held
Corporations Under the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 HARV. L. REV. 710 (1959).
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ics of making gifts to Mr. Jones' numerous minor grandchildren and to
the problem of enabling Mr. Jones to give away the Jones Manufacturing
Company for tax purposes while retaining control of it for business
purposes.
The starting point for any analysis of the Jones problem is the reali-
zation that outright gifts to the grandchildren are probably unwise, even
apart from professional reluctance to consider anything so simple. In
general, gifts of property to minors create problems on the one hand of
lack of transferability during minority (absent the appointment of a
guardian) and on the other hand of the donee's lack of judgment should
he get effective control of the property. Where the property which may
be given to the minor is an interest in the family business both lack of
transferability and lack of judgment are almost prohibitive objections.
Thus we are limited as a practical matter to some form of gift whereby
a qualified adult, possibly Mr. Jones himself, holds title to and operating
control of the donated assets, the minor merely receiving a right to re-
ceive the income from the assets, now or at some time in the future, with
possibly a right to invade the principal in certain cases.
The next step in an analysis of gifts to minors is the realization that
a legal guardianship is not the best form in which to hold the donated
property. The appointment of a guardian makes the entire operation a
matter of public record and subject to court control. Also, a guardian's
powers in investing and handling the minor's property are too inflexible
and restricted. Furthermore, establishing a guardianship (unless a
guardian has already been appointed for other reasons) is often as much
trouble as preparing a trust adequate to avoid these problems. Thus, the
forms to be considered seriously are actually limited to the custodianship
device and the various types of trusts. For reasons of space, the discus-
sion of trusts will be further limited to include only the section 2503 (c)
trust and the short-term reversionary trust.
CUSTODIANSHIPS
The custodianship device was originally created by a Model Act,
adopted by Ohio in 1955.' Subsequently a Uniform Act was drafted
covering the same subject matter, and this act has now been adopted by
most states. As of January 1, 1962, Ohio fell into line by changing over
from the Model Act to the Uniform Act. Gifts already made under the
Model Act are now governed by the Uniform Act.2
1. 126 Ohio Laws 602 (1955).
2. The Uniform Act has been codified as Ohio Revised Code sections 1339.31 through
1339.39. Gifts under the new act are made to "X as custodian for Y under the Ohio Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act." Applicability of the Uniform Act to gifts made under the Model Act
is provided in section 1339.39 (c).
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The provisions of the Uniform Act are substantially the same as those
of the Model Act. However, the Model Act was limited to gifts of stock
and securities, whereas the Uniform Act also permits gifts of money, in-
surance policies, annuity contracts, and certain mineral interests. In addi-
tion, the Uniform Act permits a wider choice in selecting the custodian,
permits compensation of the custodian, and makes certain improvements
in the administrative provisions of the law.
If Mr. Jones should decide to use the custodianship device for his
grandchildren, most of his tax objectives will be achieved.' The gift will
qualify for the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion. Subject to the excep-
tions discussed below, the income will be taxed in the grandchild's low
bracket, and the property itself will be removed from Mr. Jones' estate.4
Furthermore, these tax results are the same whether the gift was made
last year under the Model Act or this year under the Uniform Act.5
The only flies in the tax ointment arise from two exceptions which
the Commissioner believes must be made to the above rules. The first
exception is that income from custodianship property used to discharge
the obligation of the minor's parent to support him is taxed to the parent
rather than to the child even though the parent is neither donor nor cus-
todian.' The second exception is that if the donor designates himself
custodian, his statutory power either to pay out at once or to accumulate
the income and principal requires the custodianship property to be in-
cluded in his estate for estate tax purposes should he die before the minor
reaches twenty-one.7 The correctness of applying these exceptions to cus-
todians may be questioned, but it would be risky to plan gifts on the as-
sumption that the Service will not be successful in asserting such appli-
cation.'
In addition to the advantage of knowing where the Internal Revenue
Service stands on the tax questions, the use of a custodianship has the
3. The Internal Revenue Service has stated its position as to the tax treatment of the use of
the custodianship acts in a series of Revenue Rulings, as follows: gift tax - Rev. Rul. 56-86,
1956-1 CuM. BULL. 449; income tax - Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 23; estate tax
- Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 618, Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 212;
documentary stamp tax - Rev. Rul. 60-12, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 552.
4. Regardless of the form of the gift, the property will be included in Mr. Jones' estate if
he dies within three years after making the gift and is held to have made it in contemplation
of death.
5. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 212.
6. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 23; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 [hereinafter
cited as CODE Q). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.6 62(a)-4 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Reg. §].
7. Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 618; Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
8. For an attack on the Commissioner's exceptions, see Tenney, Using the Custodian Statute
as a Planning Device, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX 937, 947 (1958). For a view of
the law even more adverse to the taxpayer than the Commissioner's rulings, see Note, Recent
Legislation to Facilitate Gifts of Securities to Minors, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1476 (1956). Rev-
enue Ruling 59-357, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 212, seems expressly designated to set at rest fears
based on the "power of appointment" theory as expressed in that Note.
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great advantage of simplicity. By referring to the statute in making the
gift, the donor in effect incorporates by reference the terms of a discre-
tionary trust already drafted by the legislature. This saves time, trouble,
and legal fees, as does the fact that the custodian is not required to file an
annual Form 1041.
There are several disadvantages in using a custodianship. (1) The
Ohio statute requires that the property and all accumulated income be
distributed at age twenty-one. In the opinion of many people, all of
whom are themselves over twenty-one, a person at that age lacks suffi-
cient discretion to use wisely the uncontrolled ownership of substantial
property, and again the problem becomes especially significant if the
property is an interest in the family business. (2) If the minor dies be-
fore reaching twenty-one, the property must be distributed according to
the laws of intestate succession since the minor cannot make a valid will.
This statutory pattern of distribution may or may not be what Mr. Jones
would have preferred. (3) Since the custodianship must be for a desig-
nated minor, no provisions can be made, by this route, for after-born chil-
dren. (4) The use of a custodianship incorporates the statutory provi-
sions as a whole, even though Mr. Jones would have preferred different
terms on certain points. In short, a custodianship cannot be hand-tailored
to cover special problems or desires.?
TRUSTS UNDER SECTION 2503 (c)
One tax problem of trusts for minors relates to qualifying for the
$3,000 annual gift tax exclusion. The exclusion is inapplicable to gifts
of a future interest, and trust for minors are especially likely to involve
future interests. The chief reason for this is that where the beneficiary
is under twenty-one the grantor typically will want the trustee to have the
discretion to withhold and accumulate income for some future distribu-
tion to the child, rather than be compelled to pay it to or for him cur-
rently. The right to receive the income for sure only at some future date
is a future interest.
In 1954, this problem was alleviated by new section 2503 (c), which
specifically allows the exclusion for a gift to a minor which meets certain
requirements, even though it would otherwise be treated as a future in-
terest. These requirements are that the property and the income therefrom
may be expended by or for the donee during his minority, and that, to the
extent not so expended, they will be distributed to him at age twenty-one
or, should he die before reaching twenty-one, be payable to his estate or
as he may appoint under a general power of appointment. The custo-
9. The present discussion deals with gifts during the life of Mr. Jones. It should be noted
that a custodianship cannot be established at all by will. OHIo REv. CODB § 1339.32(A).
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dianship statute was apparently designed to come within the provisions of
this section." Accordingly, any trust drafted to come within its terms
will bear a striking resemblance to a custodianship, including the disad-
vantages of the mandatory distribution at age twenty-one and the require-
ment that the trust be for the benefit of a specific minor.
Despite the similarity of a trust under section 2503 (c) to a custodian-
ship, there are certain differences which operate to the advantage of the
trust form. (1) The terms of the trust, both as to investment powers
and otherwise, can be adjusted to meet the needs of the particular case.
(2) It is the position of the Internal Revenue Service that a trustee is
a separate taxpayer, unlike a custodian."1 Thus, though all of the in-
come from the custodianship property is taxed to the beneficiary whether
distributed or not, income accumulated by the trustee of a trust under
section 2503 (c) is taxed to the trust. If any of Mr. Jones' grandchildren
are already in high brackets the creation of such an additional taxpayer
may be helpful."2 (3) In the case of the grandchild's death, custodian-
ship property passes according to the laws of intestate succession. A trust
under section 2503(c) can be drafted so as to insure that if the grand-
child dies before reaching age twenty-one the property will be distributed
to persons designated by the grantor in the trust instrument." (4) In
the case of a custodianship both the principal and the related income must
be distributed at age twenty-one. However, under section 2503 (c) only
that property for which the gift tax exclusion was obtained need be dis-
tributed at age twenty-one. Two recent decisions hold that the donee's
interest in the income of a trust can constitute a property interest for pur-
poses of section 2503 (c) .4 If so, Mr. Jones can place property in trust
for his minor grandchildren with the provision that at age twenty-one
only the accumulated income will be distributed to them, the principal
continuing to be held in trust, and the value of the income interest will
qualify for the gift tax exclusion.
In at least two situations a trust under section 2503 (c) may be less
10. Section 2503 (c) is not limited to gifts in trust.
11. See Rev. RUl. 56-484, 1956-2 CuJm. BULL. 23.
12. On the other hand, if the minor has little other income, the applicability of his personal
$600 exemption to the custodianship income may be preferable to the $100 exemption avail-
able to a discretionary trust. Of course, even with a trust the personal exemption of the
minor can be utilized by income distributions to him, but such distributions would be subject
to the same objections as any gifts directly to a minor. Authorization in the trust for payment
of the income to a custodian might permit utilization of both the extra taxpayer and the $600
exemption, while permitting useful investment powers over the income distributed.
13. This is accomplished by giving the minor a general power to appoint by will with a gift
over to the desired persons in default of its exercise. Under these circumstances the property
will go to the takers in default since, in Ohio and many other states, a minor cannot make a
valid will. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b) (1958).
14. Arlean I. Herr, 35 T.C. 732 (1961); Jacob Konner, 35 T.C. 727 (1961).
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advantageous than a custodianship.' " (1) If Mr. Jones designates as
trustee the grandchild's parent, and if the parent-trustee has power to use
the trust income to discharge his own obligation to support the minor, it
is possible that this might be regarded as a power of appointment making
the trust property includible in the estate of the trustee-parent.'6 A Reve-
nue Ruling reaches a contrary result as to custodianships, however.
(2) If the purpose of the gift is to permit the accumulation of income to
provide for the minor's college education, a custodianship would dearly
avoid the five-year throwback rule,'8 which relates only to trusts, and may
avoid any tax on the parent at all if the criticisms of the Commissioner's
position on this point are sustained.'" Of course, the five-year throw-
back rule applies in any event only if the amount distributed in the tax-
able year is more than $2,000 in excess of the trust's distributable net
income.20
SHORT-TERM REVERSIONARY TRUSTS
If Mr. Jones places property in trust for a beneficiary for a period of
ten years or more, he will not be taxed on the income from the trust prop-
erty even though at the end of ten years the property is to be returned to
him.2 This is another form of trust which might be particularly useful
in making gifts to the minor- grandchildren. Frequently it is impossible
to determine in childhood what the ultimate financial needs and personal
characteristics of a person will be and a reversionary trust permits Mr.
Jones to take a second look. Such a device is also suitable for helping
Mr. Jones' grandparents, since it transfers the needed income flow from
his tax bracket to theirs, without adding any property to their tax or pro-
bate estates. In addition, despite his stockholdings, Mr. Jones is in the
common position of enjoying high annual compensation during his work-
ing years while facing the probability of a much reduced income after re-
tirement. In these circumstances it is especially appropriate to distribute
property in such a way as to avoid tax on the income from it during the
years of prosperity, while regaining the property and income flow in the
post-retirement years.
15. These advantages of the custodianship over the trust are in addition to simplicity and
economy, and to the availability of the minor's $600 exemption, which have already been
mentioned.
16. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c) (1) (1958).
17. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 Cum BULL. 212.
18. Reg. § 1.666(a)-i (1956). Generally speaking, a distribution of accumulated trust
income more than $2000 in excess of distributable net income for that year is "thrown back"
to each of the five preceding years in inverse order. This is done in such a manner as to
eliminate any tax saving resulting from the accumulation of such income during those years.
19. See note 8 supra.
20. CoDE 5 665 (b).
21. CoD E 673.
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If a reversionary trust is used for gifts to Mr. Jones' grandchildren, an
important question will be whether the gift of the income interest quali-
fies for the gift tax exclusion. If the income is required to be distributed
currently directly to the minor, the gift qualifies as a present interest. If
the income may be accumulated during the period of minority, the gift
may still qualify for the exclusion under the exception contained in sec-
tion 2503 (c), provided that the accumulated income is to be distributed
to the beneficiary at age twenty-one. The two cases cited above so hold
even though the principal of the trust is not distributed to the beneficiary.2
A further problem as to the gift tax exclusion exists if the trust satis-
fies section 2503 (c) for the period of minority but then continues for a
period extending beyond the beneficiary's twenty-first birthday. This
may be necessary in order to give the trust a duration of ten years or for
some other purpose of the grantor. The theory pursuant to which the
income interest until age twenty-one meets the test in section 2503(c)
that both property and accumulated income thereon be distributed at age
twenty-one is that the income interest until age twenty-one is itself an
item of property, and that this is the property distributed at age twenty-
one. If that is true, the income for the period after the beneficiary
reaches twenty-one must be a separate item of property. Considered
separately, it is a property interest which will commence in use, posses-
sion, or enjoyment at a future time and hence technically may be treated
as a future interest, even though the income until age twenty-one is con-
sidered to be a present interest.
Although the preceding analysis has the logical appeal of the medie-
val land law, it may seem unreasonable as a practical matter to hold that
income required to be distributed currently for ages twenty-one to twenty-
five is a future interest simply because for ages fifteen to twenty the in-
come may be temporarily accumulated. Accumulations during minority
are based more on biological than tax considerations, and it is possible
that the legislative thinking behind section 2503 (c) was simply that such
accumulations should not bar the exclusion, provided that the minor was
in fact sure to get any accumulation on reaching twenty-one, or at his
prior death.23
22. Arlean I. Herr, 35 T.C. 732 (1961); Jacob Konner, 35 T.C. 727 (1961).
23. Compare S. REP. No. 1622 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1954), with H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A322 (1954).
Footnote 3 in the Tax Court opinion in Arlean I. Herr, 35 T.C. 732 (1961), states that
the income interest after age twenty-one would not qualify as a present interest. However,
the point was not contested in that case.
It should be repeated that this problem arises only if income may be accumulated until age
twenty-one. If current distribution of the trust income to the beneficiary is mandatory through-
out the period of the trust, the income interest would presumably qualify as a single present
interest. However, this would have, as to the income distributed during minority, the prac-
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It should be noted that the use of a reversionary trust can involve
various technical problems. One of these is the treatment of capital gains
which are realized by the trustee during the trust period. If such capital
gains are distributed to the income beneficiary, the distribution has the
effect of giving him some of the corpus. The possibility of this renders
uncertain the amount of the original gift.
There is almost no authority on the resolution of this uncertainty,
but in private rulings the Internal Revenue Service has taken three dif-
ferent positions, allegedly depending upon whether or not the grantor is
trustee and whether or not the allocation of capital gain to the income
beneficiary is mandatory or discretionary. (1) One view is that since
the grantor cannot demonstrate how much of the corpus will ultimately
return to him, the entire property, rather than simply the income inter-
est, must be subjected to gift tax. This rule generally produces the maxi-
mum possible degree of error in computing the amount of gift, and is
undesirable for the additional reason that it creates what may be a sub-
stantial tax penalty for a situation which is likely to be entered into
inadvertently. In other words, for no particular policy reason it creates
a trap for the unwary. (2) The second view is that the size of the gift
should be measured by the total value of the property given less the
present value of the grantor's right to the eventual return of an amount
equal to its tax basis. The theory is that since the recovery of basis is not
capital gain, at least an amount equal to the basis will be returned to the
grantor. In fact, this will not be true in many cases if the basis of the
trust assets ever exceeds their fair market value. Accordingly, this ap-
proach is also inaccurate, although the amount of the inaccuracy is almost
certain to be less than that of the first approach. In addition, the
error is less obviously slanted in favor of the Treasury. (3) A third
possibility is to tax the grantor at the time of the gift only on the present
value of the ordinary income interest. Then, as capital gains are realized
and paid to the income beneficiary each such payment would be regarded
for gift tax purposes as an additional gift. This rule is favorable to the
taxpayer in splintering the gift in question, but it has the great advantage
of ultimately determining with complete accuracy the amount actually
given. It does, of course, raise the question of whether the payment of
the capital gain to the income beneficiary constitutes an addition to or
subtraction from the trust corpus during the mandatory ten-year period,
and whether, if made within nine years of the termination of the trust,
such payments constitute an addition to the trust for purposes of the five-
tical disadvantages of all direct gifts to minors. Perhaps, alternatively, mandatory distribution
to a custodian during the period of minority would achieve the desired adult control without
separating the income right until age twenty-one and the income right thereafter into separate
interests.
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year throwback rule.24 So far, however, the Commissioner appears to
have made no such contention.25
The practical solution to the problem of allocating capital gains to
the beneficiary is to advise Mr. Jones not to do it but to have capital gains
accumulated for ultimate return to himself. This makes it possible to
compute the value of the income interest from the usual actuarial tables
without complication or uncertainty.2  Of course, since the gains will
then constitute capital gains accumulated for the grantor they will be
taxable to him in the year realized by the trustee, even though the cash
proceeds of the sale will not be received by the grantor until the trust
terminates." Since short-term reversionary trusts are likely to be used
primarily by taxpayers with high current incomes such as Mr. Jones, who
is able to pay the tax before receipt of the accumulation, this theoretical
disadvantage may not be significant in practice.
Another technical problem is measuring the duration of the trust. It
is permissible to provide for a return of the trust corpus either at the end
of ten years or at the death of the income beneficiary, whichever happens
first.28 It is also possible to substitute for the ten-year requirement some
event which may not reasonably be expected to occur within ten years,
for example, the death of a person having a life expectancy of more than
ten years.2" Possibly, however, Mr. Jones might like to have the trust
terminate upon the happening of one of several events, such as the
expiration of ten years, his own death, or his wife's death.3" The ques-
tion in such a case is whether the ten-year expectancy is measured by the
expectancy of the contingencies as a group (exclusive of the life expect-
ancy of the income beneficiary, which is a separate and district standard)
or of each contingency standing alone. For example, if two people each
have a life expectancy of exactly ten years it is probable that one of the
two will die in less than ten years. Would a trust for their joint lives
qualify as a ten-year reversionary trust? Again, it is dearly the more con-
servative course to so limit the terminating events as to avoid this ques-
tion.3
1
24. CODE § 665 (b) (4).
25. The private rulings in this area are discussed in Shop Talk, 12 J. TAXATION 382 (1960)
and 13 J. TAXATION 190-91 (1960).
26. Rev. Rul. 58-242, 1958-1 CuM. BULL 251,253.
27. CODE § 677(a) (2).
28. Reg. § 1.673(a)-1(c) (1956).
29. Ibid. Measuring the trust period by the life of the income beneficiary is a separate
standard from the ten-year measure, and hence is permissible regardless of the beneficiary's
life expectancy.
30. This overlooks the assumption made hitherto that Mr. Jones is a widower.
31. Still another technical problem applicable to trusts generally, but perhaps especially to
reversionary trusts, is that a mere assignment of future income will be ineffective even if made
in trust form. Reg. § 1.671-1 (c) (1956). See Newell, Gifts to Improve the Family's Over-
all Tax Situation, p. 299 n. 24 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13:2
Hawkins, Planning the Form of the Gifts
TECHNIQUES FOR RETAINING CONTROL
If some of the gifts to be made by Mr. Jones are to consist of stock in
the Jones Manufacturing Company, it will be important to determine to
what extent he can avoid the loss or reduction of his control of the
corporation.
The use of a revocable trust would permit the maximum retention of
control as well as serving a number of important estate-planning object-
ives. 2 However, such a trust would not remove the income from Mr.
Jones' income tax return nor the corpus from his estate tax return and
hence is somewhat outside the scope of the present discussion.'
Even assuming an irrevocable trust, it may still be possible to main-
tain Mr. Jones' business control by designating him as trustee. In order
to analyze this possibility, however, it is necessary to distinguish three
types of control. The first type is the ability to use the trust assets for the
grantor-trustee's personal purposes. Any such power will defeat the tax
objectives of the trust even if it takes an indirect form such as giving the
grantor-trustee the right to use trust funds to discharge his own legal
obligations,; or the right to buy assets from the trust for inadequate con-
sideration, or the right to borrow from the trust without adequate se-
curity.
A second type of control relates to the ability to alter the allocation
of benefits created upon the establishment of the trust, either as to who
is to receive the benefits or as to when the benefits are to be received.
Examples would be the power to allocate income among a designated
group of beneficiaries or to terminate the trust at any time by the distribu-
tion of the corpus. If the grantor is to be the trustee, the trustee's powers
in this category must be extremely limited36 Some powers of this type
32. See 1 CAsNER, ESrATh PLANNING 120 (3d ed. 1961).
33. A revocable trust is not disregarded for every tax purpose and may thus give rise to
rather unexpected consequences. A dear example is that a corporation, stock of which is held
in a revocable trust, is disqualified from electing under Subchapter S. Also, in applying the
attribution rules of sections 267, 318, and 554 a revocable trust creates substantial uncer-
tainty. A similar confusion exists in state law areas, where a revocable trust is a separate
entity for some purposes but not for others.
34. The right to use trust funds for the support of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally
obligated to maintain will not result in income tax to the grantor-trustee except to the extent
the funds are so used. CODE § 677(b). The mere existence of the power is likely to be
treated as a general power of appointment for estate tax purposes, however. Reg. § 20.2041-
1(c) (1) (1958).
35. Mr. Jones should understand that even apart from tax law, a transfer of property to
himself as trustee is not a mere formality. As trustee Mr. Jones will have duties and obliga-
tions not present when he owned the stock beneficially. Self-dealing of the types suggested
can lead to litigation, even within families, and the courts frequently deal quite harshly with
lapses from proper fiduciary behavior.
36. The power of the grantor to discharge the trustee and appoint himself is the equivalent
of naming himself trustee for purposes of this discussion. See, e.g., Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3)
(1958).
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are permissible but they are limited; the limitations vary as between
estate tax and income tax, and the limitations in the field of estate tax are
not as clear as they might be.
The third type of control relates to the business management of the
trust assets. If these include a controlling stock interest in the family
corporation, such business management powers would include rights
in the trustee to vote the stock, to sit on the board of directors, and per-
haps to continue his employment as chief executive of the company.
Powers of this type appear never to have been questioned where held in
a fiduciary capacity except where combined either with powers to benefit
the grantor or to affect the beneficial interest of others3 7 Especially
where the grantor is already the president of the company with a sub-
stantial record of success there is no rule of tax or trust law which would
require him as fiduciary to remove himself from management and appoint
someone less qualified.
The difficulty with the foregoing principles is that the separation of
the types of control may be difficult to accomplish. It is obvious that the
terms of employment of the grantor-trustee-president must not suggest
improper benefits to him. A more general example of the problem may
arise from the right of the directors of a company to determine dividend
policy. Through dividend policy, it may be argued, the grantor-trustee
can allocate benefits between income beneficiaries and remaindermen.
No case has been found which holds that trust property should be in-
cluded in the grantor's estate simply because as shareholder or director
he retained control over dividend policy3n Furthermore, it is believed
that as a practical matter such contention would have little chance of
success except where the terms of the trust, the nature of the business,
or the actual conduct of the trust and business suggest that an improper
37. The statute is explicit on this point in reference to income tax liability. CODE §§ 671,
675(4). For estate tax purposes the rule should be the same. See 1 CAsNER, EsTATE
PLANNING 205 (3d ed. 1961); Reg. § 20.2041-1(b) (1) (1958). According to Helvering
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company, 316 U.S. 56 (1942), a generalized control situation which
does not include the specific powers enumerated by the Code does not, at least in theory,
result in estate tax liability comparable to the income tax liability which used to arise from
the Clifford doctrine under the 1939 Code. (The Clifford doctrine is discussed in 4 CCH
1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 3703.01.).
38. Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790 (1945) (supplemental opinion on motion
for reconsideration), non acq., 1945 CuM. BULL. 8; cf. Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47
B.T.A. 807 (1942), 1 T.C. 564 (1943), (supplemental opinion).
39. Cf. Estate of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949) (reviewed by the court), non-acq.,
1950-1 CuM. BULL. 8, aff'd on opinion below, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951):
"The Commissioner also advances two other farfetched arguments. One is that the de-
cedent, a minority stockholder and officer of Luzerne Rubber Co., could have controlled the
dividends on its common stock, and, as a director of the Trenton Banking Co., beginning in
January 1944, could have controlled the action of that institution as trustee. These arguments
are not sufficiently weighty to merit discussion." 13 T.C. at 873.
See Estate of James F. Foster, 13 B.T.A. 496, 500 (1928). See also Ward Wheelock,
7 T.C. 98, 107 (1946) (income tax decision), acq., 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
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allocation of benefits between income beneficiaries and remaindermen
was intended. However, as an added precaution it might be well in the
trust instrument to attempt some language in reference to dividend policy
designed to preclude the use of such policy to achieve the forbidden con-
trol while permitting flexibility to meet future business changes, foreseen
and unforeseen °
An alternative method of combining effective gifts for tax purposes
with the retention of business control is a separation of business property
into portions having control but limited economic benefits and portions
having substantial economic benefits but limited, if any, control. The
dearest example is a division of corporate stock into voting and non-
voting classes. After such a separation an outright gift of the non-control
property either in trust or otherwise can be made with no strings attached
without disturbing the business control inherent in the retained property.
Finally, in addition to devices which directly retain in Mr. Jones un-
questioned legal control through stock ownership or otherwise, various de-
vices may be employed which, although not as certain or as secure, may
in certain circumstances be quite effective. Thus, if stock is placed in a
reversionary trust, Mr. Jones will retain substantial power just from the
knowledge of the corporate directors and officers that in ten years and
one day he will once again be in the saddle. Again, if he retains the
office of president of Jones Manufacturing Company, perhaps with an
employment contract carefully drawn to define his role, he will probably
retain substantial practical power over the operation of the business."1
Again, in some cases it will be possible for him to retain practical control
over the board of directors even though he may no longer have a ma-
jority stock interest. Factors of this type do not lend themselves to gen-
eralization since they are so dependent upon the details and personalities
of the particular situation. However, concentration on safer and more
orthodox procedures should not lead one to overlook the possibility of
such devices.
40. Administrative powers generally can give the grantor-trustee the ability in effect to shift
benefits from income beneficiary to remaindermen and vice versa. It is recognized, howevef,
that such powers and hence such ability will be contained to some degree in almost every
well-drawn trust, since the court-made and statutory rules governing investment policy and
other matters, in the absence of contrary provisions in the trust instrument, are so conserva.
tive and restrictive that they are generally in conflict with the best interests of the beneficiaries
they are designed to protect. Accordingly, reasonable provisions of this type should create no
trouble. See note 37 supra. However, in attempting to avoid trust law restrictions, legal
draftsmen have gone so far in the direction of giving freedom to the trustee that the terms of
some trusts, taken literally, seem to contain no restraints whatever on the trustees ability to
shift benefits. In such cases, the grantor-trustee may be held to have the forbidden power,
and the trust accordingly may be included in his estate. State St. Trust Co. v. United States,
263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). This case is unlikely to be extended very far from its facts,
but it suggests the importance of making explicit some of the limits on the trustee's power
which are assumed in fact and intended by the grantor.
41. Such a contract should be a reasonable business agreement. See cases cited note 38 sapra.
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